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The success story of Korean economic development is intimately linked with the so-called 
developmental state; and education policy, as part of centrally orchestrated industrial policy, 
played a critical role in the country’s rapid industrialisation, which allowed for high employ-
ment rates, relatively modest social inequality and remarkable social mobility. However, the 
Korean success story has started to show ‘cracks’ – with labour market dualisation, rising in-
equality and ‘over-education’. Whilst acknowledging the importance of the East Asian finan-
cial crisis as external shock for the Korean political economy, we suggest more fundamental 
problems in the socio-economic and socio-political underpinnings of the developmental state 
and its education and skills formation system for understanding how Korea’s economic and 
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The development of the Korean society and economy is astonishing. From colonial suppres-
sion and the devastation of the Korean War (1950-53), the country developed into an ad-
vanced economy and high-income country within the matter of a few decades, with one of 
the fastest growing economies in the developing world. In 1996, Korea entered the ‘club of 
rich nations’, the OECD. Also, considering the absence of a developed system of social protec-
tion, it is remarkable that the country presented a relatively egalitarian society. Not only Ko-
rea  managed to ‘lift itself from poverty’ (Ringen et al. 2011) but also to reduce social inequal-
ity and to promote social mobility (Cheon 2014; Park 2010).  
The success story of Korean economic development is intimately linked with the so-
called developmental state at the heart of rapid industrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
authoritarian state subordinated all aspect of policy to its economic modernisation project. 
Education policy, as part of centrally orchestrated industrial policy, played a key role in the 
rapid economic development of the country. In fact, the Korean ‘economic miracle’ is closely 
associated with an ‘education miracle’. The critical importance of Korea’s “sound educational 
infrastructure” (Jeong 1995: 7) is widely highlighted when appraising the extraordinary rapid 
industrialisation the country experienced; and Cheon suggests a “virtuous cycle (…) in which 
education and growth reinforced each other” (2014: 219; see also Ashton et al. 2002 and Park 
2012 on the developmental education and skills formation regime). 
However, the Korean success story has started to display ‘cracks’. Admittedly, the 
slowing down of growth rates is something one might expect with the maturation of the econ-
omy. But we also observe a significant increase in social inequality, unemployment (especially, 
youth unemployment) and labour market dualisation with a massive increase in irregular em-
ployment. The struggle of young people to enter the labour market might be considered par-
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ticularly puzzling in light of substantial education expenditure and the extraordinary educa-
tional attainment of young Koreans. However, closer inspection shows considerable skills mis-
match in the Korean labour market caused by ‘over-education’ (Park 2011; OECD 2009a); and, 
despite a well-educated workforce, Korea presents very poor labour productivity by interna-
tional standards (OECD 2015). 
These observations suggest that the ‘virtuous cycle’ that has been associated with de-
velopmental skills formation is no longer in place. The decline of the developmental state is 
typically discussed in the context of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 (Lee and Han 2006; 
Lim and Jang 2006), and indeed labour market deregulation in the aftermath of the crisis is 
key to understanding the rise of irregular employment and social inequality (Peng 2012; Song 
2014). However, whilst acknowledging the importance of the East Asian financial crisis as ex-
ogenous shock for the Korean political economy that could be read in terms of breaking a 
‘punctuated equilibrium’ and creating a ‘critical juncture’ (Collier and Collier 1991; Krasner 
1988; see also on institutional stability and change in comparative political economy: Deeg 
and Jackson 2007; Mahoney and Thelen 2010), we suggest more fundamental problems in 
the socio-economic and socio-political underpinnings of the developmental state and its ed-
ucation and skills formation system for understanding how Korea’s economic and education 
miracle turned into ‘education inflation’, skills mismatch and social polarisation. 
Before the East Asian financial crisis, the developmental state and its education and 
skills formation regime appeared as a stable equilibrium allowing rapid economic modernisa-
tion; and the above mentioned ‘virtuous cycle’ suggests institutional complementarities un-
derpinning self-reinforcement and stability (i.e. path dependence). According to the promi-
nent Varieties of Capitalism approach, “two institutions can be said to be complementary if 
the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other” 
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(Hall and Soskice 2001: 17; see also Crouch 2010; Deeg 2007). Yet, there were considerable 
conflicts beneath the surface, which has received insufficient attention in the developmental 
state and, more generally, the East Asian political economy literature. These long-standing 
conflicts are critical to the transformation of Korea’s previously highly coordinated market 
economy (CME) after democratic transition in the late 1980s. Paradoxically, the success of 
the Korean developmental strategy, we argue, undermined the very foundations of the de-
velopmental state. As intended, the ‘economic miracle’ produced large, family-controlled 
business conglomerates (so-called chaebols), whose rising economic and political power un-
dermined the state’s steering capacity, and this process was accelerated by democratisation 
and economic liberalisation of the 1990s.  
Democratisation also undermined the state’s capacity to supress the population’s 
deeply engrained desire for academic education (as a means of social mobility), which was, in 
the aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis, further driven by labour market dualisation, 
associated job insecurity and rising social inequality in the face of considerable gaps in social 
protection. Whilst huge private investments in education facilitated the ‘education miracle’, 
it ultimately produced an incredibly inefficient allocation of resources, over-education and 
skills mismatch. In other words, the ‘virtue’ of mobilising significant resources for education 
turned into ‘pathological’ strategies to secure chaebol employment, which has become ever 
less likely because of chaebols’ ever shrinking internal labour markets. By contrast, small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) suffer from a lack of skilled workers. Korea is, as a result, 
characterised by skills polarisation and a low skills/low productivity trap as far as large parts 
of the economy are concerned. 
Instead of relegating the transformation of Korea’s education and skills formation re-
gime to the exogenous shock that is associated with the East Asian financial crisis, we highlight 
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endogenous sources of institutional change that are not compatible with the equilibrium-
functionalist approach of Varieties of Capitalism and institutional complementarities. We ar-
gue that the developmental state and its education and skills formation regime have always 
been a very fragile equilibrium that rested upon an all-powerful state (an authoritarian regime 
in fact) rather than genuine self-reinforcement that is associated with institutional comple-
mentarities. Contestation, though suppressed, persisted during the authoritarian episode, 
and democratisation in the late 1980s finally allowed voice and outright ‘defection’ of not 
only employers but also parents.  
In an endogenous model of institutional change, the focus of analysis is on “how social 
and political interaction transforms institutions” (Capoccia 2016: 1096). Here, the issue of 
power and, especially, the imbalance of power is critical. As Amable (2000) underlines, insti-
tutions and complementarities are the result of social and political struggles, and ‘losers’ do 
not simply disappear. Not only the East Asian political economy literature but also, more gen-
erally, the institutionalist literature have been downplaying power and conflict in episodes of 
institutional reproduction (cf. Peters, Pierre, and King 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). For 
this reason, a historical-political approach to institutional change is much better equipped to 
help us understand the political economy of education and skills in Korea and the country’s 
departure from the developmental education and skills formation regime. By highlighting 
how the change of power dynamics between the state, business and parents drove the break-
down of the fragile equilibrium that led to Korea’s departure from the regime, the paper seeks 
to overcome the equilibrium-functionalist bias in the literatures and to contribute to identi-
fying endogenous sources of institutional changes. Korea’s education and skills formation sys-
tem and its transformation is discussed against the experiences of Germany and Britain. The 
former is widely considered the archetype of a CME with an apprenticeship model combining 
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workplace training with vocational training schools (so-called ‘dual system’) to produce (in-
dustry) specific skills, whereas general skills formation through universities features less 
prominently. By contrast, Britain – the European prime example of a liberal market economy 
(LME) with a voluntarist skills formation regime – relies heavily on general skills formation at 
universities with little attention paid to specific skills through the vocational education and 
training (VET) system (Ashton, Sung, and Turbin 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001). This compara-
tive perspective aids the assessment of the scale and nature of change observed in Korea, and 
supports the argument that Korea has not only departed from its developmental trajectory 
(characterised by a high degree of coordination) but also increasingly displays features of 
LMEs. This shift towards a liberal education and skills formation regime has been facilitated 
by business defecting from the developmental alliance, as well as liberal employment and 
social protection to which parents responded with excessive investments into education. 
Thus, rather than adopting an unspecified post-developmental perspective, we suggest the 
use of established tools in comparative political economy – not only to improve our under-
standing of education and skills in Korea, but also for better integrating East Asian political 
economies in the comparative literature of advanced political economies. Our analysis of the 
Korean case also calls for a greater prominence of education policies in the dominant institu-
tionalist political economy literature with its limited focus on skills formation in the workplace.  
The paper is structured as follows: We first review Korea’s historical developmental 
education and skills formation regime and the associated ‘economic miracle’. The paper then 
assesses the initial expansion of higher education in the 1980s and the crumbling of the de-
velopmental regime. In the analysis of education and skills after democratisation, we first look 
at employers withdrawing from the old regime, and then parents and the outbreak of ‘edu-




Developmental Skills Formation, Late Industrialisation and the Korean “Economic Miracle” 
When Korea gained independence from Japan in 1945, its economy was dominated by agri-
culture, and the country was not only utterly poor and under-developed but also lacked any 
meaningful educational infrastructure. During colonialism, the Japanese rulers heavily re-
stricted access to education and even banned the use of the Korean language. To fight wide-
spread illiteracy, the Rhee Syngman government (1948-1960) of liberated (and at first demo-
cratic) Korea initiated a massive and rapid expansion of primary education. Though inter-
rupted by the Korean War (which brought nationwide devastation and impoverished the Ko-
rean people even further), educational progress was remarkable, and the country saw the 
illiteracy rate of the over-12 year-olds drop from 78% in 1945 to 27.9% by 1960. At the early 
stage of industrialisation, this expansion of basic education provided the economy with an 
abundance of unskilled but literate workers to build up light, labour-intensive manufacturing 
that allowed breaking into world markets with low-cost labour (Ashton et al. 2002; Ihm 1999). 
Based on a strong belief that education presents as an important means of social mo-
bility and social status (and is not only an end in itself as Confucianism would suggest; cf. Seth 
2002), the rapid expansion of primary education stoked up considerable social demand for 
secondary education, quickly accelerating in the 1960s. In an educational context with firmly 
established and widely accepted ranking systems among secondary schools and tertiary insti-
tutions, parents in pursuit of their children’s admissions to desired schools and colleges mo-
bilised considerable financial resources for private tutoring to complement public education. 
So-called ‘shadow education’ developed unseen dimensions in Korean society, especially with 
affluent middle classes using their financial power to fuel increasing educational competition. 
In 1967, it was estimated that about 9 in 10 six-graders in Seoul received private tutoring, for 
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instance. To address this development which turned into a social concern receiving consider-
able public attention, the Park Chung-Hee government, which forced itself into power in a 
military coup d’état in 1961, introduced a Middle School Equalisation Policy in 1968, which 
replaced a school entrance examination system with a lottery system within school districts. 
This was followed by a similar policy for high schools. Also, in addition to turning private 
schools into de-facto state schools in terms of finance and governance structures, ‘elite’ 
schools in the eyes of the public were converted into general schools as another measure to 
crack down the deeply engrained hierarchy among Korean schools. Unsurprisingly, this au-
thoritarian policy met considerable opposition from well-off families, private and elite school 
organisations and some education experts who feared falling school standards, but the au-
thoritarian Park Chung-Hee government remained unimpressed. In the wider population, a 
sense developed that private education and competition reached unacceptable dimensions, 
and for this reason the government’s draconian action is thought to have boosted the legiti-
macy of the regime. Importantly, this equalisation policy also needs to be seen in the broader 
political economic context of early Korean industrialisation, which needed a large and steady 
supply of workers with basic to moderate skills to satisfy the demand from a rapidly expanding 
manufacturing sector. In this situation, the ambitions of the middle classes (also reflected in 
a rising number of students repeating the sixth grade to prepare for middle school entrance 
exams) was considered misplaced and perceived as hampering economic development (Park 
2010). 
The economic success of the developmental strategy of the 1960s created labour 
shortages and corresponding pressure on wages, which in turn made light-industry-based de-
velopment increasingly unfeasible. In this context, leaving the basic skills route of industrial 
development became a political priority and a deliberate change of strategy towards higher 
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value-added manufacturing was undertaken. The Park Chung-Hee government started to pur-
sue an ambitious Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation Plan in the early 1970s, and the devel-
opmental state considered skills policy as an intimate element of its new industrialisation 
strategy. It was understood that the supply of mainly semi-skilled labour to the emerging in-
dustries was imperative for the government’s economic project, and thus required significant 
efforts in human capital investments for greater productivity and labour force stability. This 
provided the socio-economic underpinnings for increased expenditure on education and 
training but also on health and enterprise welfare (Ihm 1999; Deyo 1992).  
In this context, building on the progress in primary education, the Park Chung-Hee 
government increased its investment in secondary education with a strong vocational orien-
tation, to produce the craftsmen needed for the desired heavy and chemical industrialisation. 
Throughout the 1970s, we observe an expansion of vocational high schools, and the govern-
ment was keen to increase the number of students in these schools. Whilst the government 
was not able to ‘force’ students into vocational education, the very strict control of enrolment 
quotas for each public and private university at the departmental level – not meeting public 
demand – severely limited access to higher education; and this effectively directed young 
people onto the vocational track (Ihm 1999; Kim and Lee 2006; Morris 1996). 
The prioritisation of vocational high schools, however, was not without controversy 
either. Employers felt that vocational high schools could not keep up with changes in the 
workplace and provided them with outdated skills. Unsurprisingly, many parents also felt un-
easy about pushing their children onto the vocational track. Parents continued to have a 
strong preference for general high schools (humanities track) that were geared towards uni-
versities; and vocational high schools and vocational two-year colleges, which were promoted 
by the authoritarian government, were regarded as being of low social status. Applicants to 
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vocational colleges were typically those who failed to enter four-year universities (Ihm 1999). 
This strong preference for academic education and little appreciation for the vocational track 
compares well to the situation in Britain, which also displays a rather rigid educational hier-
archy, ascribes great importance to rankings and is well known for its elite institutions in ed-
ucation. Thus, with its ‘working-class heritage’, VET in Britain, likewise, suffers from a very 
poor image and is typically left to underachieving youngster who fail to enter university 
(Fisher and Simmons 2012).  
A key element of the Korean industrial strategy was the nurturing of national champi-
ons to promote economic development. Providing low-interest credits and industrial subsi-
dies among others, the developmental state facilitated the building of business conglomer-
ates, which became to dominate the Korean economy (Amsden 1989; Johnson 1987). Criti-
cally, this economic structure with the presence of large workplaces allowed the establish-
ment of enterprise-based skills formation. In 1974, in the face of the insufficiency of VET 
schools and anticipated skills shortages in the government’s science and technical manpower 
forecast, new legislation required large employers (first the ones with more than 500 employ-
ees, and later the ones with more than 300) to train a certain share of their workers, and non-
compliant businesses were fined. Although the government did not directly ‘force’ employers 
to intensify their investments in vocational skills, the training levy resulted in a significant rise 
in training activities – from 48,000 craftsmen between 1967 and 1971 to about 177,000 in the 
following five-year period, and numbers peaked at almost 340,000 between 1977 and 1981 
(Green et al. 1999; Park 2012). SMEs lacked the capacity for workplace-based skills formation, 
but they benefited from some ‘excess’ skilled labour that the training levy produced in large 
workplaces. Yet, SMEs continued to rely, to a considerable extent, on state-provided VET, 
contributing to the increasing skills schism between chaebols and SMEs (Ashton et al. 2002). 
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Nonetheless, until the mid-1980s, wage differentials by firm size were “almost non-existent” 
(Korea Labor Institute 2009: 80); and, indeed, we observe a decline in social inequality from 
the 1970s (Cheon 2014), supporting the argument of egalitarianism during the authoritarian 
regime (Park 2010).  
In this critical episode of Korean late industrialisation and rapid economic growth, as 
well established in the developmental state literature (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990), we find a 
strong state, with the infamous Economic Planning Board and its five-year economic devel-
opment plans at the heart of policy-making, that pursued a manpower planning policy, in 
which vocational high schools and workplace training delivered the specific skills needed for 
industrialisation. Also, the extraordinary centralisation in the developmental state made pos-
sible an effective coordination between industrial and education policies (Ashton et al. 2002; 
Park 2012). State-led coordination, thus, allowed to overcome market failure (especially, the 
problem of free-riding) that is commonly associated with specific skills formation (cf. Crouch 
2006 on skills formation systems). However, besides ensuring compliance of business, gov-
ernment also needed to suppress the public demand for academic education (namely, dis-
couraging general high schools and limiting the access to higher education) to provide the 
economy with vocational skills. Hence, with regard to both business and society, the devel-
opmental state displayed strong interventionist regulation; and it was ultimately the massive 
imbalance of power between the authoritarian government, on one side, and business and 
society, on the other side, that allowed the state to dominate the production regime and 
enforce its vision of industrialisation, which admittedly produced some remarkable economic 
results. This and the seemingly stable reproduction of the developmental institutional ar-
rangement could, prima facie, be read in terms of the notion of complementarity of an equi-
librium-functionalist approach. Though, the success of the developmental strategy was also 
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critical for the political legitimation of the authoritarian rule of President Park Chung-Hee (cf. 
Kwon 1999), to which also strict employment protection enforced by the state in core sectors 
of the economy contributed in the absence of comprehensive social protection (Deyo 1992; 
Song 2014). 
Korea in this critical episode of industrialisation is well described as a CME as the au-
thoritarian state displayed extraordinary ‘coordinating’ capacity, but it presents an institu-
tional reproduction that is rather different from Germany’s traditional corporatism, where 
employers and trade unions are intimately involved in coordination, including the skills for-
mation system (Bosch and Charest 2008; Hall and Soskice 2001). Instead, coordination in Ko-
rea’s political economy rested upon a strong state that was able to impose its policies in the 
absence of democracy (which makes Korea also different from its Japanese neighbour; cf. 
Pempel 1998 and Rosenbluth and Thies 2010 on Japan’s political economy). In the authoritar-
ian state of Korea, trade unions were repressed to ensure low-cost and disciplined labour and 
to prevent the rise of the political left, as open dissent from employers was not tolerated by 
the Park Chung-Hee government either (Deyo 1987; Jones and Sakong 1980).  
 
The Expansion of Higher Education and the Crumbling of Developmental Skills Formation  
After initial success, the training levy struggled to deliver, and we observe a decline in work-
place learning from 340,000 to 115,000 between 1982 and 1986. An increasing number of 
companies, still arguing that the training system was too rigid to respond to the changing skills 
demands of the Korean economy, preferred to pay fines rather than providing in-house train-
ing. Apparently, the training levy failed to establish a skills formation system that was compa-
rable to the aspired German vocational system, but instead produced relatively basic voca-
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tional skills (mainly at the semi-skilled level) (Ashton et al. 2002; Park 2010). Hence, the de-
velopmental skill formation regime displays some first cracks. Business had become increas-
ingly unwilling to comply with the government’s expectations; and employers’ rising eco-
nomic power, to a great extent a result of the government’s successful industrialisation strat-
egy, allowed business to display some limited dissent (Hundt 2009; Kim 2003). The persistent 
employer reluctance to engage positively with vocational training in the workplace suggest 
that the enforced skills formation regime of the 1970s did not develop into a stable equilib-
rium. Employers failed to develop genuine interest in upskilling their workforce. This is rather 
different to the German experience where employers developed a genuine commitment to 
vocational skills formation, which facilitated remarkable productivity improvements and Ger-
many’s system of diversified quality production (Streeck 1992). 
Additional (political) pressure on education and skills formation can be observed in 
the aftermath of the assassination of President Park Chung-Hee in 1979 by the director of 
Korea’s central intelligence agency. This assassination created a power vacuum in the military 
regime, which was used by General Chun Doo-Hwan to seize power in a coup d'état. Not only 
was the new government confronted with increasingly non-compliant employers, but also 
with growing public dissatisfaction; and accordingly it needed to increase its political legiti-
macy. For the urban middle classes, education remained a major social concern, and the re-
markable expansion of secondary education in the 1970s fuelled further the demand for 
higher education. Confronted with considerable political pressure and social unrest across the 
country (including a democratic uprising that was crushed as exemplified in the Gwangju mas-
sacre), the new Chun Doo-Hwan government eased entry into higher education by increasing 
admission by 30% (as compared to original 1981 admissions quota) and by 50% in the follow-
ing year. The new policy, however, also prescribed that the number of graduates should not 
14 
 
exceed the number of the previous admissions quota in order to increase competition 
amongst students – also to divert them from widespread political activism. This new ‘gradu-
ation quota’ proved incredibly unpopular – not only with parents and students who feared 
failing their degrees after making considerable time and financial investments, but also with 
universities. The government, lacking the power of the previous Park Chung-Hee administra-
tion, could not ignore the public pressure; and it decided not to implement the graduation 
quota, showing the limits of government control in the 1980s despite continued authoritarian 
rule. As a consequence, student number almost tripled between 1979 (the year of Park assas-
sination) and 1986 (the year before the beginning of Korean democratisation) (Kim 2008). 
 Whilst relaxing the regulatory stance on higher education, the Chun Doo-Hwan gov-
ernment implemented an outright ban of private tutoring in 1981, in response to its souring 
demand in the face of highly competitive university entrance exams. Middle classes continued 
to make excessive use of private tutoring with an increasing effect on lower classes, which 
were not actually in a financial position to enter the costly ‘race’ for university education. For 
a growing number of families, private tutoring presented an immense financial burden; and 
the ban, for this reason, received some considerable public support, as the equalisation policy 
during the Park Chung-Hee government (Park 2010). 
 The development in the 1980s mark the beginning of “massification” of Korean higher 
education (Kim 2008: 233). Yet, despite allowing a considerable growth in student numbers, 
it is important to note that the state continued to perform the role of a critical regulator. Not 
only continued the government to regulate student numbers, but also, importantly, it banned 
private education to improve resource allocation in education. Further to this, regardless of 
employers’ discontent, the training levy remained in place. Political legitimatisation was cer-
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tainly an important reason for the Chun Doo-Hwan government to better accommodate pa-
rental preferences for academic education. But these developments starting in the early 
1980s also need to be seen as the government’s attempt to facilitate higher skills in order to 
promote knowledge-based high-technology industries for a more diversified economic struc-
ture (Green et al. 1999; Cheon 2014; Jessop 2016). Thus, on the one hand, we find a govern-
ment that continued with significant intervention into the economy complying with the image 
of the developmental state; on the other hand, the authoritarian state displayed greater re-
sponsiveness to societal demands to legitimise its rule, which could be interpreted as a de-
cline in ‘coordinating’ capacity – not only responding to parents but also ‘allowing’ large com-
panies to reduce their training efforts. In other words, although the state certainly continued 
to dominate, we observe a shift in the balance of power -- no longer allowing the state to 
prescribe in the manner of the Park Chung-Hee government. Critically, in terms of the educa-
tion and skills formation regime, the change in education and skills policy initiated the move 
towards LMEs with their focus on more general skills, as opposed to specific (vocational) skills 
which dominate CMEs like Germany, but also its ‘developmental’ variant as exemplified in the 
Korean case.   
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Democratisation, Economic Liberalisation and the End of Developmental Skills Formation  
The departure from developmental skills formation and move toward general skills formation 
continued after the country’s transition to democracy at the end of the 1980s. At first, though, 
the government of the newly elected President Roh Tae-Woo (with one foot still in the past, 
as he was ‘hand-picked’ by the previous military regime and successful only, since opposition 
forces could not agree on a united candidate) tried to ‘reinvent’ the developmental skills for-
mation system. It extended the training levy to smaller companies (as small as with 150 em-
ployees) as well as increasing the levy; and the government wanted to increase the share of 
young people in vocational high schools from about one third to 50%. This, however, did not 
translate into greater training engagement, or more students on the vocational high school 
track (Green et al. 1999; Ihm 1999). Also, the government’s experimenting with vocational 
training that was thought to emulate the German dual system failed to deliver. Employers 
continued to display little interest in upskilling their workforce but rather stuck with their 
established low-price product strategies (Green et al. 1999; Jeong 1995).   
The failed copying of the German dual system resembles similar experiences in Britain, 
where the conservative Major government introduced the so-called ‘Modern Apprenticeship’ 
around the same time, in order to improve intermediate (vocational) skills with the ambition 
to boost productivity levels, which compared poorly to some of the UK’s major competitors, 
such as Germany, France and especially the US. As in Korea, British employers did not show 
much interest in this new apprenticeship system, which did not seem to correspond well with 
dominant low-price product strategies (Fuller and Unwin 2003; Hogarth, Gambin, and Hasluck 
2012). This suggests that ‘German-style’ vocational training is not compatible with low-price 
product strategies; and both Korea and Britain might be considered as being caught in ‘low 
skills/low productivity’ equilibria (Finegold and Soskice 1988; Lauder 1999).  
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With the second free election and the victory of the conservative opposition leader 
Kim Young-Sam (1993-98), however, rather comprehensive changes took place. The new gov-
ernment pursued some far-reaching so-called ‘liberalisation’ policies changing the face of the 
Korean political economy. Developmental skills formation continued to decline, and it even-
tually came to an end – as we observed, more generally, a slow ‘death’ of the developmental 
state. The all-powerful Economic Planning Board was abolished, and the financial sector was 
liberalised allowing firms’ entrance into the non-banking intermediaries sector as well as 
greater access to equity markets and foreign credit. At the same time, industrial subsidies had 
been almost phased out, largely due to mounting budget deficits. Employers strongly pressed 
for neoliberal reform; and similar pressure for the liberalisation of the Korean economy came 
from the US, which became, after the end of the Cold War, increasingly intolerant towards 
their substantial trade deficit with Korea and the Korean government’s protection and control 
of its domestic market. American pressure to push back the government’s strong grip on the 
economy thus strengthened the position of employers. Importantly, these liberalisation poli-
cies (especially, the deregulation of finance) made business (in particular, chaebols) less reli-
ant on the state, allowing employers to exercise their voice more assertively in policy-making. 
With increasingly liberal business preferences, the old developmental alliance between the 
state and business disintegrated (Fleckenstein and Lee 2017; Kong 2000). In the field of edu-
cation and training (as in the wider political economy literature), we see the notion of ‘post’-
developmentalism emerging (Park 2007; Park 2012). 
Critically, for developmental skills formation, the government – responding to increas-
ing pressure from employers – abolished the training levy and replaced the compulsory work-
place training system with a voluntary system where companies can receive some financial 
support for vocational training through the newly established employment insurance. The 
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new system, however, failed to provide any strong incentives for meaningful (initial) voca-
tional skills formation in the workplace but rather facilitated short-term training courses  
(Yoon and Lee 2009; Lee 2007). Employers not only show incredibly little interest in vocational 
training in their workplaces but also display little appreciation for vocational high schools and 
junior colleges. This leads the OECD to conclude very weak involvement of business in VET 
policy. Acknowledging the challenge of little employer engagement, the government created 
sector councils for better communication with business, but this initiative failed to produce 
any meaningful engagement of employers (OECD 2009a). These developments also display 
great similarities with Britain. Earlier though in the 1980s, the Thatcher government pursued 
aggressive deregulation policies, including the abolition of Industrial Training Boards, which 
had the authority to introduce training levies. These changes moved Britain very quickly onto 
a fairly liberal skills formation regime (King 1997). Dealing with the long track record of low 
employer interest in vocational skills, Britain also introduced Sector Skills Councils, but these, 
as in Korea, failed to deliver greater employer engagement (Keep, Lloyd, and Payne 2010). 
The abolishment of the training levy system and the accelerated decline in workplace 
training had huge implications for skills supply. As discussed earlier, in the developmental 
skills formation systems, large employers trained beyond their demand, and thereby provided 
‘excess’ skilled labour to SMEs. With sharply reduced training efforts, large employers not 
only reduced the pool of skilled labour for SMEs, but also started recruiting experienced work-
ers from SMEs (especially, from those in their supply chain). This causes major problems for 
SMEs. These, typically under enormous cost pressure from chaebols, not only lack the capac-
ity (in terms of resources and time) to engage in vocational training (or train young graduates 
from university), but also are faced with an ever greater danger of their skilled and experi-
enced workers being poached by larger companies, with which they cannot compete in terms 
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of pay and benefit packages. Thus, whilst SMEs increasingly rely on the recruitment of expe-
rienced workers to meet skills need, it has become ever more difficult to attract and retain 
these in the face of chaebols’ growing interest in experienced workers as well (Jeong 1995; 
Park 2007). In this context, it does not come as a great surprise that the SME sector has been 
suffering from skills shortages and that the productivity gap between large companies and 
SMEs have been growing (OECD 2015). 
As part of the government’s liberalisation agenda, we also saw significant changes in 
higher education policy. With the rise of the so-called knowledge-based economy and grow-
ing global competition, the traditional Korean education system, emphasising uniformity and 
standardisation, was increasingly seen as inadequate to nurture creative workforces with di-
versified skills required in the new economic environment, in particular with the great im-
portance ascribed to high-technology industries for future economic success. Coinciding with 
the ever greater prominence of neoliberal thinking within the bureaucracy, the Kim Young-
Sam government became increasingly susceptible to market-based, supply-oriented solutions 
for innovation in education and skills policy that were thought to better address the needs of 
Korea’s modernising economy (Ablemann, Choi, and Park 2012; Park and Kim 2014; Park 
2013).  The very influential Presidential Commission for Education Reform (1994-96) explicitly 
called for a shift in the government role from “controlling and regulating” to “encouraging 
and supporting” (Presidential Commission on Education Reform 1996: 83). Also, in its delib-
erations, the commission, diagnosing the ineffectiveness of the existing education and train-
ing system, explicitly rejected the objective of further vocationalisation and abandoned the 
Roh Tae-Woo government’s ambition of increasing enrolment target for vocational high 
schools; and instead deregulation of the higher education sector was suggested for the ex-
pansion of student numbers (Ihm 1999). Following the recommendations of the commission, 
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higher education experienced changes of an unseen scale during the Kim Young-Sam govern-
ment to lift the country’s skill levels. The deregulation of the strict admission system (with the 
exception of Seoul in order to prevent further migration to the metropolitan area, and the 
exception of some subjects, e.g. medicine and teaching) resulted in a massive increase in stu-
dent numbers. In addition, the government deregulated the establishment of new universi-
ties, which resulted in a number of new institutions including ‘satellite campuses’ of Seoul-
based universities (Kim and Lee 2006). Abandoning the interventionist strategy of the devel-
opmental state and putting faith into a market-based approach (Kim and Lee 2006; Park 2012), 
these reforms by the Kim Young-Sam government mark a critical shift away from specific skills 
formation in vocational high schools and workplaces (as promoted by the developmental 
state) to a system that more strongly focuses on general skills through the higher education 
system to promote knowledge-intensive and high-technology industries, especially in the in-
formation technology sector (Cheon 2014).  
This shift in industrial strategy also needs to be seen in the context of considerable 
wage increases after democratisation. Often employing militant strategies, trade unions, es-
pecially in large workplaces, flexed their organisational muscles and achieved remarkable im-
provements in pay and corporate welfare (typically in excess of improvements in productivity). 
This undermined the competitiveness of Korean industry – “stuck between cheap-labour 
China and high-tech Japan” (Kim 2010: 314). These developments led policy-makers to the 
conclusion that the country needed to proceed from an industrial to the above mentioned 
knowledge-based society in order to stay internationally competitive. In this context, the gov-
ernment, with ever greater trust in market mechanisms, stepped back in order to allow 
chaebols’ entering of high-tech industries; and business conglomerates then took the ‘driving 
seat’ (Lauder 1999; Park 2012). 
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Also, employers, feeling the pressure from rising labour costs, started pushing for la-
bour market deregulation. In the labour market regime of the developmental state, the gov-
ernment effectively enforced a no-lay-off policy in large workplaces, in addition to prescribing 
considerable corporate welfare measures. This system of job protection (i.e. de-facto lifetime 
employment for core workforces) and corporate social welfare allowed residual social policy 
without much unrest during the period of fast industrialisation. Whilst imposing here some 
considerable costs on employers, the authoritarian state, repressing organised labour, also 
enforced wage constraint in order not to jeopardise the competitiveness of Korean industry 
in world markets (Deyo 1987). Democratisation and globalisation successively undermined 
this compromise between the state and employers. Business considered labour market de-
regulation for both insiders and outsiders imperative -- the former to allow corporate restruc-
turing, and the latter for a greater use of irregular workers to reduce labour costs. The first 
initiatives for labour market deregulation by the Kim Young-Sam government resulted in a 
reform gridlock with opposing trade unions, but the following centre-left government of Kim 
Dae-Jung, under the pressure of the East Asian financial crisis, implemented the failed labour 
market deregulation of its predecessor, which translated into a considerable increase in irreg-
ular employment (approximately 35% of all wage-earners according to conservative esti-
mates) – thus amplifying existing dualism in the Korean labour market (Fleckenstein and Lee 
2017; Lee 2011). Irregular workers not only receive lower wages, but also face much greater 
employment insecurity and less social protection (despite some important improvements in 
social security for outsiders during the Kim Dae-Jung government). The greater use of irregu-
lar workers allowed employers reducing more costly internal labour markets. Having said that, 
labour market insiders also typically had to endure deteriorating pay and working conditions 
in exchange for job security (Song 2014). These dramatic developments since the late 1990s 
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have translated into rising poverty rates and income inequality, undermining Korea’s previous 
relatively egalitarian social structure (Chi and Kwon 2012; Park 2010).  
The rapid disintegration of the developmental skills formation regime after democra-
tisation suggests that the previous model relied on enforcement by a strong state rather than 
genuine support from employers – their reluctance to engage in workplace training in the 
1980s turned into political pressure for deregulation. Put differently, democratisation re-
sulted in a massive shift in the power balance between the state and business, with chaebols 
exercising their voice most strongly. The dismantling of developmental skills formation and 
the expansion of higher education were part of wider changes in the Korean political economy, 
including the deregulation of labour markets with enormous implications for Korea’s social 
fabric. With democratisation and losing control over ever larger chaebols, the state saw its 
steering capacity decline. Developmental skills formation, as the developmental state more 
generally, have become both economically and politically unfeasible. Instead, Korea moved 
firmly towards an LME education and skills formation regime, facilitated by more liberal la-
bour market regulation and increasing inequality associated with this. Paradoxically, these 
developments have partly been the consequence of the state’s industrial strategy, namely 
the creation of national champions that could compete in global markets. In other words, the 
(developmental) state created colossal chaebols dominating the economy, and these con-
glomerates eventually became too powerful that was incredibly difficult to ignore their de-
mands. Globalisation and cost pressures further contributed to the shifting power balance 
between business and the state, as employers exploited their ‘exit option’ from producing in 
Korea. Unlike the episode of late industrialisation, chaebols gained the upper hand. However, 
developmental skills formation not only experienced huge pressure from business but also 




Democratisation, Parents and the Outbreak of ‘Education Fever’ 
Whilst authoritarian governments were reasonably successful suppressing academic educa-
tion, this was no longer possible in democratic Korea with parents aggressively pressing for 
the educational credentials of their children. With democratization came the greater appetite 
for more individualistic education, and this further fuelled the transformation of the educa-
tion system in Korea – driven again by the middles classes, which ultimately thought to use 
their financial strength to gain advantage for their off-spring (Ablemann, Choi, and Park 2012; 
Lo et al. 2015). After democratisation, private education expenditure increased considerably 
– for higher education but also ‘shadow education’ in so-called hagwons (private tutoring 
institutions) complementing public schooling. Whilst Japan is widely considered the pioneer 
in private tutoring, where students, typically in jukus, receive intensive supplementary edu-
cation (particularly during school vacations), Korea not only followed the trajectory of its 
neighbour but shows an even greater extent of private after-school education. Household 
expenditure for private tutoring has successively increased since democratisation in the late 
1980s and has become equivalent to about 80% of public expenditure on primary and sec-
ondary education. The nearly 100,000 hagwons in Korea employ more teachers than the pub-
lic education sector and have become the largest employer of graduates in humanities and 
social sciences. In 2015, private education spending per child hit a record high, with 7 out of 
10 children receiving private tutoring and with elementary school children being most reliant 
on it. Also, not coming with much surprise, we find high-income parents (the top quintile) 
spending about 8 times as much money on their offspring than the poorest families (the bot-
tom quintile). To access good-quality tutoring, private education is a major force driving do-
mestic migration, contributing to the uneven development between Seoul and the rest of the 
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country. It also facilitated migration within Seoul to areas with a high density of hagwons. 
Notably, we find a concentration of about 6,000 hagwons in wealthy Seoul borough of Gang-
nam, where the strong presence of private institutes is considered a key reason for rising 
property prices (Asian Development Bank 2012; Jones 2012; Statistics Korea 2016, 2015; Kim 
2010). In light of these observations, it seems fair to conclude the outbreak of “education 
fever” (Seth 2002) in democratic Korea. 
Challenging Confucian explanations, survey data tell us that excessive private spend-
ing for tutoring is, first and foremost, driven by the desire to enter prestigious universities for 
good job prospects. In Korea, it is a widely held belief that the status of the university attended 
translates, more or less directly, into labour market success. The prestige of university is 
therefore considered to largely determine later life chances. Unsurprisingly, as with Britain, 
Korea has a widely accepted university ranking system, structuring university preferences and 
reinforcing these. Data also show that having fewer children raises parental expectations; and 
that parents, though to a lesser extent, are concerned about the quality of public schools. 
Parents also report a perception that their children would experience a disadvantage if they 
did not attend hagwons (Jones 2013). Private tutoring has, obviously, become a social norm, 
and dominates the lives of young learners. 
The assumption that the prestige of the university one attends greatly determines 
one’s later life chances is confirmed when looking post-graduation labour market success. 
There is considerable evidence that ‘elite’ universities indeed pay off in the labour market 
(Kim and Lee 2006), and unsurprisingly two-year junior colleges do not offer great income 
prospects compared to four-year universities. But we also observe a significant difference 
between four-year universities located in Seoul and regional universities, and it is noteworthy 
that the university is more important for labour market success than the academic discipline 
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(with the exception of a few obvious subjects, such as medicine and business administration). 
In short, Korea presents a highly stratified higher education system (Park 2015).  
Korean policy-makers show increasing awareness of the excessive nature of private 
tutoring, but only limited measures to contain it were taken (notably, a ‘hagwon curfew’ at 
10pm, the prohibition of school teachers creating questions for hagwons, and public after-
school programmes) (Jones 2013; Kim and Lee 2006). However, it also needs to be noted that 
government has further fuelled the explosion of shadow education when the Kim Young-Sam 
administration (1993-98) increased the number of so-called ‘special purpose high schools’ 
(especially, those with foreign languages specialism), which turned into de-facto elite high 
schools, effectively demanding private tutoring to access these highly selective schools. More 
recently, the conservative Lee Myung-Bak government (2008-13) followed in the steps of Kim 
Young-Sam with a high school diversification programme, which aimed at creating 300 new 
specialised high schools for greater hierarchy and competition in the schools system (Park 
2010). As an alternative to entering the ‘race’ for these highly selective schools, an increasing 
number of parents even opts for a more ‘extreme’ educational strategy – that is sending their 
offspring overseas for school education at an early age, which is thought to facilitate chil-
dren’s English language development in particular (Lo et al. 2015). 
The great desire for academic education has translated into extraordinary enrolment 
rates in higher education. In fact, nowhere else in the OECD, we see more young people en-
tering tertiary education (OECD 2009b). Education expansion provided the growing Korean 
economy with highly qualified workers, but the boom of higher education came at the ex-
pense of intermediate skills; and we observe ‘over-education’ causing a severe skills mismatch, 
in addition to low ‘education premiums’ for tertiary education by international standards 
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(Park 2011). Thus, whilst there is considerable evidence that the attendance of certain uni-
versities pays off, the overall increase in the number of university graduates outpaced labour 
market demand, leaving many young people with poor prospects in the labour market (Cheon 
2014). In particular, the supply of graduates outstrips the chaebol demand for graduates – 
not only because of the massive increase in higher education but also because of shrinking 
internal labour markets in chaebols, which increasingly make use of irregular workers to re-
duce labour costs as discussed above. Put differently, the strong preference for employment 
in large companies and the antipathy for SMEs meets a reality of an increasingly limited ca-
pacity of the former to absorb university graduates (Park 2007).  
Large companies cope well with this education and training system and in fact find 
themselves in the comfortable position to ‘cherry-pick’ the best graduates. SMEs, by contrast, 
struggle with education and training that is thought to prepare for employment in chaebols. 
This “distorting influence” (Lauder 1999: 286) of business conglomerates in the Korean labour 
market undermines SMEs, which increasingly fail to satisfy their (vocational) skills needs and, 
accordingly, display poor labour productivity, as discussed in the previous section. We ob-
serve a widening training and productivity gap between large companies and SMEs with their 
large share of irregular workers (Cheon 2014). The considerable private investment in educa-
tion therefore effectively amplifies skills shortages and the productivity problems in SMEs, as 
private investment in the Korean ‘winner-takes-all’ labour market is geared towards employ-
ment in chaebols – with parents pressing for educational credentials of their offspring so that 
they can enter chaebol employment. At the same time, VET is neglected, locking SMEs in a 
low skills/low productivity equilibrium. Put differently, Koreans mobilise extraordinary private 
resources for the education of their children, but these resources are not allocated most effi-
ciently from a macro-economic point of view. 
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However, Koreans’ great concern about prospects in the labour market is easy to grasp 
when looking at the growing dualism in the Korean labour market. Despite less generous con-
ditions than in the past, the best wages and welfare, as well as the greatest job security, are 
still achieved with large employers (especially, chaebols), whereas the employment condi-
tions in SMEs saw much deterioration. Critically, we observe a massive increase of wage ine-
quality, with SMEs’ relative wage to that of large employers dropping from about 90% in 1980 
to about 60% in the 2000s; Korea Labor Institute 2009). Unsurprisingly, when asked about 
their reluctances to work in SMEs, a Korean survey reveals that two thirds of respondents 
mention poor salaries, closely followed by lower job security and then poorer benefit pack-
ages (Kim, Kim, and Yun 2012). Also, international survey data tells us that Koreans are greatly 
concerned about job security compared to their counterparts in most OECD countries. Only 
40% of Koreans consider their jobs secure, which presents a considerable gap in comparison 
to the ‘hire-and-fire’ labour market of the US and the UK, for instance (with 71% and 68%, 
respectively). In Japan, whose labour market is often considered rather similar to the Korean 
one, 61% of employees consider their jobs safe – a more than 20 percentage point gap to 
Korea (ISSP Research Group 2013). In addition to polarisation between employment between 
large and small workplaces, we observe a (partly overlapping) core/periphery distinction in 
terms of regular and irregular employment. Not only have irregular workers a rather short 
average job tenure of 30 months (compared to 85 months for regular workers), they also paid 
36% less than labour market insiders and experience significant gaps in social protection. Ac-
cordingly, the intensifying labour market dualism in Korea is widely considered the main 
driver for the rise in social inequality; and employment status is also closely linked to poverty 
among the working-age population. Given that irregular employment is rarely a ‘stepping 
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stone’ into regular jobs, it might not be surprising that many young people, fearing the ‘scar-
ring effect’ of irregular jobs, prefer non-employment over these jobs. We find many young 
people delaying graduation or making efforts of human capital building outside formal edu-
cation (for instance, overseas language courses). Strong employment preferences for large 
employers make Korea one of the very few countries where the NEET rate for university grad-
uates is higher than the overall age group of 15-29 year-olds (24.8% as compared to 18.0%) 
(OECD 2016). 
In this context of strongly dualised labour markets and social protection (and the as-
sociated rise in social inequality), it might not surprise to observe ‘over-investment’ driven by 
the hope to avoid precarious employment, even though (from a macro point of view) much 
of this investment is inefficient. In other words, anxiety of students and parents in the face of 
rising social inequality, economic uncertainty and (job) insecurity (associated with globalisa-
tion and related changes in Korean society and economy) drives ever more risky private in-
vestments in education to succeed in Korea’s increasingly ‘winner-takes-all’ labour market, as 
the core of well-paid and well-protected labour market insiders has been shrinking.  
 
Conclusions  
Starting as early as in the 1990s and with accelerating speed since the second half of the 1990s, 
Korea moved increasingly towards a liberal education and skills formation regime with the 
country’s great reliance on general skills formation at universities rather than specific skills 
formation in the workplace and vocational training schools, which had previously been a de-
fining feature of the developmental regime. Also, as in the liberal political economy of Britain, 
Korea displays signs of a ‘low skills/low productivity equilibrium’. By contrast, in recognition 
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of the lack of intermediate (vocational) skills, the experimenting with German-style dual train-
ing system failed, which also resembles an experience in Britain. Against this background, ob-
served changes in Korea are best described as a path departure from the developmental tra-
jectory towards an increasingly liberal education and skills formation regime, rather than a 
transformation within the trajectory of coordinated market economies. 
Challenging equilibrium-functionalist approaches and related arguments portraying 
the East Asian financial crisis as a critical juncture, we have shown that these developments 
started prior to the financial crisis, though it certainly accelerated the rise of the liberal edu-
cation and skills formation regime. Instead of reducing the explanation to the exogenous 
shock of the financial crisis, we have argued that the very success of the developmental state 
undermined its education and skills formation regime, as the state’s industrial strategy cre-
ated powerful chaebols, which ultimately challenged the developmental state. We thus find 
critical endogenous sources for institutional change with important implications for the 
power architecture of the Korean political economy. As early as the 1980s, it can be seen that 
employers had not developed genuine support for the skills policy of the authoritarian state. 
This is rather different from the German experience, where business became a strong sup-
porter of vocational skills formation in workplaces. When the government’s authority started 
dwindling in the 1980s, business could afford not meeting the government’s workplace train-
ing targets, for instance; and democratisation at the end of the decade allowed an outright 
‘defection’ from the developmental alliance with employers displaying policy preferences re-
sembling their counterparts in LMEs rather than CMEs. Not only the transition to democracy 
but also economic liberalisation empowered business and undermined the state’s coordinat-
ing capacity.  
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Whilst a weakened government in the 1980s, seeking political legitimisation in turbu-
lent times, displayed some though limited responsiveness to parents’ great desire for aca-
demic education, after democratisation the state could no longer suppress society’s drive for 
ever more education as a means of social mobility or to defend achieved social status. Not 
only do we observe a massive increase in private education expenditure for tertiary education, 
but also the rise of shadow education at the level of primary and secondary education, fuelled 
by dualisation and poor social protection in the country’s winner-takes-all labour market. The 
deregulation of employment protection after the East Asian financial crisis and the associated 
rise in social inequality amplified the drive for education, showing the strong interconnection 
between educational strategies, on the one hand, and social policy and societal change, on 
the other hand. 
In both cases, the defection of business and parents, a shift in power undermined the 
state’s coordinating capacity. Thus, despite seemingly stable institutional reproduction, the 
education and skills formation regime of the developmental state presented a very fragile 
equilibrium that rested upon an uneven balance of power rather than institutional comple-
mentarity. Also, challenging equilibrium-functionalist models, these approaches fail to cap-
ture that the observed shift in power ultimately produced a pathological equilibrium of ‘edu-
cation inflation’, skills mismatch and social polarisation. The study of education and skills in 
Korea therefore suggests that institutionalist political-economic analysis of change needs to 
take power more seriously instead of largely relying on functionalist assumptions of institu-
tional complementarities; and related to this, the predominant literature needs to address 
how positive reinforcement (as in the case of the Korean economic and education ‘miracle’) 
turns into a pathological equilibrium, which is obviously at odds with equilibrium-functionalist 
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theory. Here, power-distributional approaches offer invaluable insights. For the study of ed-
ucation and skills, the examination of the Korean case illustrates the intimate relationship 
between education and social policy as well as the labour market and social inequality. This 
also calls for further research to be fed into the dominant institutionalist political economy 
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